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INTRODUCTION
The article Human-Centered Civil Justice Design' introduced a novel approach to
improve the civil justice system. Human-centered civil justice design reflects best
practices in problem solving 2 and begins with empathizing with intended beneficiaries and
stakeholders, using surveys, observations, and interviews to immerse designers in the
experiences of these stakeholders. Human-centered designers consider the needs and goals
of stakeholders and harness psychological and behavioral science to ideate and prototype
possible solutions, which the designers empirically test with pilots and randomized control
trials. Moreover, human-centered civil justice designers seek to reconcile the diverse
process values that the civil justice system seeks to promote. Human-Centered Civil
Justice Design theorized that procedural justice has a plural effect on the public's
experiences of the civil justice system and that procedural justice can be harnessed to
advance the plural process values that human-centered civil justice designers seek to
realize. In this Article, we present the results of an empirical legal study designed to test
that hypothesis.
Our civil justice system seeks to advance plural process values. 3 When evaluating
the fairness of our civil justice system writ large, and its particular rules, some draw on
utilitarianism to argue that the civil justice system aims for deterrence and that litigation
is the instrument for influencing or constraining behavior to advance society's substantive
policies. 4 Others argue that our civil justice system seeks to vindicate rights and effectuate
1. Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 745 (2017).
2. Id. at 775-83; PAUL BREST, NADIA ROUMANI & JASON BADE, PROBLEM SOLVING, HUMAN-CENTERED,
AND STRATEGIC PROCESSES 4 (2015).
3. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 763-69.
4. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-
77 (1968). But see Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
EnfbrcementDecisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1024-31 (2009).
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values and that litigation is a means through which persons are enabled to obtain, or to
receive assurance of obtaining, the rights that society provides. 5 Some draw on the
normative theory of welfare economics to argue that our civil justice system seeks to
advance efficiency. 6 And still others, drawing on a Kantian ideal of respect for persons or
accounts of democratic legitimacy, argue that the civil justice system seeks to advance the
twin pillars of participation and respect for human dignity.7 Thus, our courts are an
important means by which persons participate, "or have their wills 'counted', in societal
decisions they care about," and courts address the loss of dignity that persons suffer when
denied an opportunity to address their grievances. 8
Accordingly, a perspective that embraces these plural values advanced by the civil
justice system better accords with the actual administration of civil justice.9 Moreover, the
civil justice system seeks to promote diverse experiences of justice, including fairness,
outcome satisfaction, positive emotions, perceptions of accuracy, perceptions of
effectiveness, and perceived legitimacy.10 A legal culture that embraces plural values
would not only tolerate these diverse experiences, but would facilitate engagement on how
to reconcile these diverse experiences with the plural process values that civil justice
promotes, thereby achieving a more flexible, effective, and ultimately just civil justice
system. 1
Procedural justice researchers have demonstrated that, when the public experiences
procedural injustice, the perceived legitimacy of the civil justice system erodes, whereas
when the public experiences procedural justice, perceptions of legitimacy are fostered. 12
Decades of research reveal that procedural justice powerfully influences compliance with
5. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights. Part !, 1973 DUKE L. J. 1153, 1171-77 (1974). See also Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment
on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 113-18 (2011);
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System And Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147,1217-25 (1992).
6. See e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 5 (2002); RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); Richard A Posner, Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) (hereinafter "Posner, Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure").
7. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 1172-75; see, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofa Theory of Value,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2-38
(1979).
8. Michelman, supra note 5, at 1172; see, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of1a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976); Michelman, supra note 5, at 1173-75; ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FiSS, THE
STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2-38 (1979); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and
Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1822-25 (2014).
9. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 763-72, 790-99.
10. Id. at 772-89, 790-99.
11. Id. at 790-99.
12. Id. at 772-75; Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANNU. REV.
OF PSYCHOL. 375, 379-80 (2006); Kristina Murphy, Tom R. Tyler & Amy Curtis, Nurturing Regulatory
Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective When People Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 1, 2-5 (2009).
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legal decrees, 13 cooperation with legal authorities, 14 and engagement in other pro-social,15
participatory, 16 and democratic behaviors. 17 Given the plural effects and consequences of
this social-psychological phenomenon for promoting a vibrant American democracy, 18 the
public's experiences of procedural justice must be heeded when evaluating the civil justice
system's operations and dynamics.
To be sure, tension may exist between efficient justice and procedural justice.
Acknowledging this tension, however, leads to greater precision when engaging in civil
justice system design. For example, if litigation-related cost savings are sought, by whom?
Are those who receive the benefit of savings the same or different from those who bear
the burden and cost of diminished procedural justice?
This Article empirically investigates the plural effects of procedural justice and
reports the results of an experiment conducted with a sample of the American public.19
The experiment examines the extent to which procedural justice has a plural effect on the
public's thoughts, feelings, and experiences with civil justice. Specifically, does granting
the public procedural justice broadly influence a range of experiences, including: fairness,
outcome satisfaction, positive and negative emotions, perceptions of legal accuracy,
perceptions of the effectiveness of procedures, and perceived legitimacy, regardless of the
outcome obtained? If so, do these plural effects converge on a single underlying factor-
specifically, fundamental experiences of justice?2 0
While foundational to theories of civil justice, this Article is the first to examine
these questions in the legal domain using psychological experiments. By drawing on
theory in the field of social psychology and conducting an experiment with the American
public, we begin to illuminate answers to these questions and discuss implications for
theorizing about the extent to which legal culture and legal institutions should embrace
plural process values.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents literature on
different process values and procedural justice. Part II describes our psychological
experiment, which investigates the plural effects of procedural justice, and then reports its
major findings. Part III discusses the implications of this research on process values, and
its implications for judges and court administrators.
13. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-75; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
14. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-75; see, e.g., Betsy Stanko et al., A Golden Thread, a Presence
Amongst Uniforms, and a Good Deal of Data: Studying Public Confidence in the London Metropolitan Police,
22 POLICING & SOC'Y 317, 318-320 (2012); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence EJfcts in
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 365, 365-74 (2010).
15. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-75; see, e.g., David De Cremer & Daan Van Knippenberg, How do
Leaders Promote Cooperation? The Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858,
858-60 (2002).
16. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-75; see, e.g., David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, Managing Group
Behavior: The Interplay Between Procedural Justice, Sense of Self and Cooperation, 37 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 151, 185-93 (2005).
17. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-75; see, e.g., E. A. LIND, & T. R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE. (N.Y. Plenum. 1988); Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural Preference:
How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 643-44 (2014).
18. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 783-89; see, e.g., Tyler, supra note 13, at 375-400.
19. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 775-89.
20. Id.
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I. PLURAL PROCESS VALUES
Human-centered civil justice design respects the plural process values that the civil
justice system seeks to sustain. This section collects a taxonomy of these different process
values. Frank Michelman, in his seminal article, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, describes several process values-including
deterrence values, effectuation values, and dignity and participation values-described
below. In addition to those values identified by Michelman, a civil justice system also
seeks to promote efficiency and equal treatment of particular classes of parties. As will be
described in Part IV, these plural process values have implications for a human-centered
form of managerial judging.
Beginning with deterrence values, under the classic approach advanced by Jeremy
Bentham, to deter an activity the perceived net cost of an activity must exceed the
perceived net benefit.2 1 Therefore, to deter wrongful conduct, our society should harness
legal procedures, including private litigation, to increase the net cost of unlawful activity
as a means of ensuring that members of society conform their conduct to the law. 22 From
this perspective, legal procedures influence or constrain behavior in ways consistent with
substantive public policies.23 Civil processes, including private litigation, are part of a
system to ensure that all members of society comply with the duties and obligations society'
imposes on them.
The Supreme Court has observed that the threat of litigation and liability deters
misconduct. 24 While the threat of suit may induce public and private actors to alter
unlawful conduct,2 5 others have aptly observed that, despite its deterrent aspirations, the
civil justice system often under-deters misconduct and under-enforces our laws. 26 This
under-deterrence stems from a number of factors: The public is uninformed of rights and
entitlements. Many cannot afford counsel and are unable to navigate the civil justice
systempro se, and many are fearful of litigating against powerful public and private actors
and of the retaliation that may result.2 7 Procedural and evidentiary obstacles reduce the
21. This is the classic utilitarian approach advanced by Jeremy Bentham. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1967). Modem
formulations have been advanced by several scholars, including Gary Becker. See Becker, supra note 4, at 176-
77.
22. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986);
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986); cf Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J.
949, 982 (2003).
23. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 1175.
24. See, e.g., Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161; Rivera, 477 U.S. at 575; Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307.
25. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787-91 (1991); Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay:
The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, The
Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2007).
26. The gap between ideal and actual practice has became especially wide in the context of forced consumer
arbitration clauses that circumvent federal enactments, including federal civil rights, antitrust, and securities
protections. See Resnik, supra note 7; Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[H]ere is the nutshell version of today's opinion, admirably flaunted rather than
camouflaged: Too darn bad.").
27. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plainti. and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247, 284, 295-96 (1988) (noting specifically
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likelihood that a suit will deter wrongdoing. 2 8 Further, Bentham's theory of deterrence
presumes that members of the public comply with law after coldly calculating probabilities
and penalties, a presumption which scholars have recently challenged in light of extensive
empirical research on heuristics and biases, which suggests that people are only
"boundedly rational." 2 9
Next, effectuation values posit that civil processes are the means by which persons
are able to get, or are given assurance of having, whatever society deems rightfully theirs.
From this perspective, one views the world from the standpoint of a member of the public
harmed by unlawful conduct (as distinguished from the perspective of society as a whole,
a perspective more closely aligned with the value of deterrence). 30 Value is ascribed to the
actual protection and realization of the interests of the litigant that the law purports to
protect and effectuate and, more generally, to a prevailing assurance that those interests
will be protected. 3 1 Private litigation is regarded as a process for providing this protection
and assurance. An important social purpose of the civil justice system is compensating
victims for injury. As Karl Llewellyn long ago suggested, civil processes are designed to
provide the person harmed a "right"-"a likelihood ... [to] induce a court to squeeze out
... damages; more: to the extent that the likely collections will cover [the victim's]
damage." 3 2 This is, in effect, the basic economic model of litigation: plaintiffs net
expected gain = gross gain - litigation costs. 33
Those who advance the value of effectuating rights have highlighted the routine
under-compensation provided to victims harmed by injurious conduct, 34 a problem that is
most acute in the context of losses so small to each consumer or employee that no person
would think it rational to sue for damages. Modem civil procedure has attempted to
address this problem by allowing a variety of procedures that aggregate these small claims
into financially viable larger claims, such as the private attorney general model and the
class action device. 35 Yet scholars have warned of the difficulty of monitoring plaintiffs'
attorneys who are compensated out of the pool of funds awarded to large classes of harmed
"ignorance of their rights, poverty, fear of police reprisals, or the burdens of incarceration.").
28. Id. at 283; Brian J. Serr, Turning Section 1983's Protection of Civil Rights Into an Attractive Nuisance:
Extra-Textual Barriers to Municipal Liability Under Monell, 35 GA. L. REv. 881 (2001); Dina Mishra, Comment,
Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to Check Police Officers'Power, 117 YALE
L.J. 1549, 1554 (2008). Moreover, Joanna Schwartz has demonstrated that accounts of civil justice that turn on
robust theories of deterrence rely too heavily on outdated model of unbounded rational decision-making which
in tension with more recent, empirically based accounts of bounded human cognition and decision-making.
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1028-30.
29. See Id. at 1026-27.
30. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 73-74 (1985).
31. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 1176-77.
32. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 22 (1962).
33. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes fbr Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. I
(1984). See also Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal
on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L. J. 2270, 2303 (2012).
34. See Saks, supra note 5, at 1217-25; Stephen J. Spurr & Walter 0. Simmons, Medical Malpractice in
Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 21 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 315, 316 (1996) (finding that medical
malpractice cases settle for approximately 16 to 20% less than the expected value of claims in litigation "because
plaintiffs are risk-averse").
35. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 5, at 83-84.
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individuals. 36 Of late, the private attorney general model and class action device have
come under considerable attack. 37 The effectuation value of civil litigation is closely
related to corrective justice, which concerns itself with what is needed to restore the status
quo ex ante and compensation.38
Another value that the civil justice system seeks to promote is efficiency.39 While
civil justice renders society's substantive policies more probable and public, debate centers
around the costs imposed. Tort reformers, as well as judges, 40 have lamented the costs
and burdens imposed by litigation,4 1 including the cost of civil discovery. 42 This concern
relates to two aspects of costs: direct costs and the cost of legal error.4 3 First, the civil
justice system imposes direct costs on courts, agencies, litigants, witnesses, and jurors.
Second, as Judge Richard Posner44 has argued, insofar as civil procedures aim to promote
economic efficiency, then both the mistaken imposition of legal liability (false positives-
incorrectly finding a defendant liable) and the mistaken failure to impose liability (false
negatives-incorrectly finding a defendant not liable) reduce efficiency. Thus, the civil
justice system imposes cost of error which may be regarded as the product of two factors:
the probability of error and the cost of both false positive and false negative errors that
occur. 45 Both direct costs and decisional errors are social costs imposed by the civil justice
system.
Efficiency also relates to the time expended within a civil justice system: all else
being equal, a civil justice system with less time delay would be more efficient. While.
efficiency is desirable, this value often raises distributional questions that demand
specificity. For example, if cost reduction is desired, then whose costs shall be reduced:
costs borne by claimants, defendants, the public, courts, all or some of the above? If
reduction of delay is desired, then whose time shall be saved: delay borne by claimants,
defendants, the public, courts, all or some of the above? Finally, in many instances, cost
efficiency and time efficiency conflict. On the one hand, hiring more court personnel may.
increase the capacity of courts to resolve disputes and, therefore, reduce delay; on the
other, this investment in court personnel will increase direct costs borne by the public and,
therefore, conflict with the aim of reducing direct costs.
36. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory fbr
Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
37. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 5; Catherine R Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The
Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007).
38. See Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L. REv. 349 (1992).
39. See COVER & FISS, supra note 7, at 1.
40. See, e.g., Oritz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 865 (1999) (Rehnquist, C. J. concurring).
41. See, e.g., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BREAKING THE LITIGATION HABIT: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR
LEGAL REFORM 9-10 (2010) (contending that "lawsuits are absurdly slow, capricious, and inefficient") (quoting
WALKER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 343 (1991).
42. See generally Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073 (2002); Robert
M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American
Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11 STUD. L., POL., SOC'Y 95 (1991) (citing examples of these economic
concerns).
43. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure, supra note 6, at 400-02.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 401-06.
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Beyond meting out optimal levels of deterrence, vindicating rights, and efficiency,
the civil justice system advances participation and dignity values. Participation values
view civil processes as a means through which the public exerts influence or has its will
counted in societal decisions. 4 6 Relatedly, dignity values reflect concern for the
psychological harm, humiliation, or loss of self-respect that members of the public may
suffer if denied an opportunity to redress harm through civil avenues. State coercion must
be legitimized, not only by efficient substantive policies, but also by democratic processes
that allow the public to participate in decisions affecting individual and group interests.
Decreasing transparency and diminishing participation, then, may cause alienation and a
loss of legitimacy and erode fundamental democratic norms and values.4 7
The civil justice system also seeks to promote the value of equal treatment. 48 Equal
treatment values reflect concern with whether civil processes are applied differently or
result in different outcomes for particular classes of parties. 4 9 For example, civil processes
may systematically undervalue evidence that would tend to support the position of a
particular class of disputants. When this occurs, this class would have a legitimate
objection that these civil processes have treated them unequally. From this vantage point,
one may ask "whether like cases receive like attention and like evidentiary development
so that the influence of ... arbitrary factors ... [is] minimized." 50 Similarly, one may ask
whether categories of litigants are treated similarly so that arbitrary factors, such as
animus, bias, and discrimination directed against particular classes of litigants, are
curtailed. If the civil justice system in process or outcome systematically favors the
interests of dominant groups while disparaging the perspective of stigmatized or powerless
groups, then this systemic inequality and material injustice may reflect ideological
influences in judging, including system-justifying beliefs about the nature of inequality in
society. 5 1
Finally, equal treatment bridges both procedural justice and distributive justice. For
example, when managerial judges endeavor to treat equally the parties in live interactions
before them, the parties will not only likely experience the judge as neutral and
trustworthy, but they will also experience a sense of procedural justice. Literature on
distributive justice reveals that people apply multiple psychological criteria for discerning
equal treatment: the principle of equity (contributions-based), the principle of equality
(equal division), and the principle of need (based on individual needs). At times, there may
be tension in the ways in which courts and parties appraise the criteria for equal treatment.
46. See J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ch. Ill (1861) ("There is no
difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme
controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen.. .having a
voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty.")
47. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 91-93 (2011).
48. See Mashaw, supra note 7, at 52-54; Charles H. Koch Jr, Community of Interest in the Due Process
Calculus, A, 37 Hous. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (2000); Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New
Means to Measure Civil Procedure, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187 (2013).
49. See Mashaw, supra note 7, at 53.
50. Mashaw at 53.
5 1. Such systematically skewed outcomes may also reflect the problem of cognitive illiberalism. See Dan
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. 837 (2008).
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For example, the distributive justice criterion applied by courts when "treating like cases
alike," (e.g. equal division) may be in conflict with the criterion held by plaintiffs (e.g.
need based) and defendants (e.g. contribution based). 52 These epistemic conflicts
underscore the need for courts to provide all parties with procedural justice. Procedural
justice increases the likelihood that parties will experience justice regardless of whether
their preferred distributive justice criterion is ultimately adopted.
In summary, this taxonomy has revealed multiple process values, which the civil
justice system seeks and human-centered civil justice design embraces. In Part II, we use
a national study to empirically evaluate the extent to which procedural justice advances
these several ends.
II. AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE PLURAL EFFECTS OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE
To investigate the plural effects of procedural justice, we conducted a social
psychological experiment with members of the American public. This study
operationalized procedural justice, consistent with Part II.C., by drawing on the attributes
and dimensions theorized and demonstrated in the literature to affect perceptions of
procedural justice. We employed a between-subjects experiment with two factors. The first
factor was procedural justice with two levels: procedural justice present vs. procedural
justice absent. The second factor was outcome with three levels: favorable, unfavorable,
and pending. After randomly assigning members of the public to the conditions in this 2
(procedural justice) x 3 (outcome) between-subjects experiment, our psychological
measures examined perceptions and experiences of fairness, outcome satisfaction,
emotions, legal accuracy, legal effectiveness, and legitimacy.
A. Hypotheses
1. Plural Effects of Procedural Justice
Consistent with psychological science on procedural justice, we hypothesized that
procedural justice will broadly influence the way members of the American public think,
feel, and experience civil justice. Mainly-regardless of whether members of the public
receive a favorable outcome, unfavorable outcome, or have a decision pending-when
procedural justice is afforded, their perceptions and experiences of fairness, outcome
satisfaction, positive emotions (dampening negative emotions), legal accuracy,
effectiveness of process, and legitimacy will be fostered and promoted. Conversely-
regardless of whether members of the public receive a favorable outcome, unfavorable
outcome, or have a decision pending-when procedural justice is withheld, their
perceptions and experiences of fairness, outcome satisfaction, positive emotions
(dampening negative emotions), legal accuracy, effectiveness of process, and legitimacy
will be eroded and diminished.
52. Mashaw, supra note 7, at 53.
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2. Convergence of Plural Effects: Experiences of Justice
Next, if the public effects are observed, our exploratory hypothesis was that these
plural effects on thoughts, feelings, and experiences might converge on an underlying
factor, specifically the fundamental experience of justice.
B. Research Method and Overview
1. Participants
To examine the plural effects of procedural justice, we conducted an experiment
using a sample of members of the American public, which we recruited online via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. 53 Our original sample consisted of 600, but participants were excluded
from our analysis for failing the attention or manipulation checks described below. Our
final sample (N = 400) consisted of 204 (5 1%) males and 196 (49%) females, who had on
average completed at least some courses at a four-year university. The mean age was 35.42
(SD = 12.83). Participants self-identified as White/European American (81.8%),
Black/African American (4.5%), Latino/a (2.8%), Asian American/Pacific Islander
(6.3%), and/or Other (4.8%).
2. Materials and Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to either a
procedural justice afforded or a procedural justice withheld condition, where participants
then reviewed three legal dispute scenarios. Simultaneously, participants were randomly
assigned either to a favorable outcome, an unfavorable outcome, or a pending decision
condition. In short, the experiment entailed a 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 3
(outcome: favorable, unfavorable, pending) between-subjects design.54
53. See Krista Casler et al., Separate but Equal? A Comparison of Participants and Data Gathered via
Amazon's MTurk, Social Media, and Face-to-face Behavioral Testing, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEH. 2156 (2013);
Rick M. Gardner et al., Using Amazon's Mechanical Turk Website to Measure Accuracy ofBody Size Estimation
and Body Dissatisfaction, 9 BODY IMAGE 532 (2012); John J. Horton et al., The Online Laboratory: Conducting
Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399 (2011); Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri,
Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon's Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1 (2012); Gabriele
Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411
(2010). Participants received a $1.00 payment as compensation for participation in our study. Amazon
Mechanical Turk, AMAZON, www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome.
54. Amazon Mechanical Turk is widely employed within the behavioral and social sciences as a platform to
recruit nationally representative samples of the American public. For literature discussing between-subject
designs, see SHERRI L. JACKSON, RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS A CRITICAL THINKING APPROACH, 152-
62 (2003); S. Alexander Haslam & Craig McGarty, Experimental Design and Causality in Social Psychological
Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 245 (Carol Sansone et al. eds., 2004);
and Eliot R. Smith, Research Design, in the HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY
PSYCHOLOGY 17-39 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., Ist ed., 2000).
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Figure 1. 2 x 3 Between-Subjects Design
Favorable Outcome Unfavorable Dispute Pending
Outcome
Procedural Procedural Justice Procedural Justice Procedural Justice
Afforded &Justice Afforded & Ufaorae Afforded & Pending
Afforded Favorable Outcome Resolution
Outcome
Procedural Procedural Justice Procedural Justice Procedural JusticeWithheld &
Justice Withheld & Withheld & Pending
Withheld Favorable Outcome Unfavorable Resolution
Outcome
After random assignment, each participant reviewed three dispute scenarios: an
employment dispute, a child custody dispute, and a landlord-tenant dispute. In designing
the dispute scenarios, our objective was to devise disputes where the correct outcome of
each dispute was unclear. 5 5 For example, in the employment dispute scenario, the
participants played the role of a long-time employee who was fired after being wrongly
accused of stealing money from a cash drawer. The terminated employee knew which co-
worker stole the money and confronted the thief, but did not report the co-worker to a
supervisor. Instead, the employee challenged the termination by filing a grievance with
the company's human resources department. In the child-custody dispute scenario,
participants were placed in the role of a spouse who was involved in a divorce with a
contested issue of child custody in which both spouses where equally qualified to take
custody of the child. In the landlord-tenant dispute, participants were placed in the role of
a renter who received an eviction notice after allowing their desperately ill mother to stay
in their apartment, which may have violated a restriction on overnight guests. Participants
were asked to decide whether to challenge the eviction by filing a complaint with a local
housing official.
After reviewing the legal disputes, participants rated the dependant measures,
described below, and answered two manipulation checks ensuring that they understood
(and remembered) the process employed and the outcome of the dispute, along with two
attention checks ensuring that they carefully attended to what they read. 56 Last,
participants provided demographic information.
a. Procedural Justice Manipulation
We manipulated the first factor, procedural justice, with two levels: present or
absent. As discussed in Part II.C., the literature on procedural justice demonstrates that
55. Perception of procedural fairness is especially important in the face of uncertainty. See Kees van den
Bos, Uncertainty Management: The Influence of Uncertainty Salience on Reactions to Perceived Procedural
Fairness, 80 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 931, 931-41 (2001).
56. See Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis, & Nicolas Davidenko, Instructional Manipulation Checks:
Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 867 (2009).
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certain attributes-including whether one is provided a voice and an opportunity to be
heard, whether there was a neutral and trustworthy decision maker, and whether one was
treated with dignity and respect-shape perceptions of procedural justice. The procedural-
justice-present participants were provided all of these attributes, while the procedural-
justice-absent participants were afforded none. 57 In the employment dispute, for example,
the condition in which procedural justice was afforded stated:
You met with the HR official. The official allowed you to explain why you believe you
should not have been fired. The official was polite and respectful in response to your
complaint. The official used objective criteria in determining your wrongful termination
complaint and was unbiased when making a decision. You found the official trustworthy.
Whereas the condition in which procedural justice was withheld stated:
You met with the HR official. The official did not allow you to explain why you believe you
should not have been fired. The official was neither polite nor respectful in response to your
complaint. The official did not use objective criteria and was biased when making a decision.
You found the official untrustworthy.
b. Outcome Manipulation
We manipulated the second factor, dispute outcome, with three levels: favorable,
unfavorable, or pending decision (i.e., awaiting an ultimate decision). In the employment
dispute, for example, participants who were randomly assigned to the favorable outcome
were informed: After the meeting, the HR official decided you were terminated incorrectly.
You are reinstated into your old position. Those who were randomly assigned to the
unfavorable outcome were informed: After the meeting, the HR official decided that you
were terminated correctly. You are not reinstated into your old position. Finally, those
who were randomly assigned into the pending decision outcome were informed: You will
soon be informed of the HR official's decision.
3. Measures
Based upon their thoughts, feelings, and experiences about the handling of the legal
disputes, participants rated items that comprised seven dependent measures-overall
fairness, outcome satisfaction, legal accuracy, effectiveness of process, positive emotions,
negative emotions, and legitimacy. All items were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(Not at all) to 7 (Very), except for overall fairness which was rated on a 10-point scale
from I (Not at all fair) to 10 (Very fair).5 8 After creating mean composites for each item
across the three disputes, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses and created mean
composites that reflect these seven dependent measures, detailed below.
a. Overall Fairness
Participants rated the fairness that they experienced on six items-overall fairness,
fair resolution, fair handling, fair treatment, fair decision, and fair procedures-which
57. The manipulations are described in Part II.B, infra.
58. Participants rated these dependent measures in the following order: emotions (positive and negative),
legal accuracy, efficiency of process, overall fairness, outcome satisfaction, and legitimacy.
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assessed their experience of overall fairness of dispute resolution, including aspects of
both procedural fairness (How would you rate the overallfairness of this experience?) and
outcome fairness (How fairly would you say the issue (or problem) was resolved?). These
six items were averaged to create an overall fairness composite (Cronbach's a = .979),59
with higher scores indicating greater experiences of overall fairness. Participants randomly
assigned into the pending dispute condition addressed their impressions of the handling of
the dispute thus far (How fairly would you say the issue (or problem) is being resolved?).
b. Outcome Satisfaction
Participants rated the outcomes they received on three items-outcome satisfaction,
outcome fairness, and satisfaction with final result-which assessed their satisfaction with
the final outcome (How satisfied are you with the outcome you received?). These three
items were averaged to create an outcome satisfaction composite (Cronbach's a = .986),
with higher scores indicating greater outcome satisfaction. Because participants randomly
assigned to the pending decision condition had not obtained outcomes, only participants
who received favorable or unfavorable outcomes completed these items.
c. Positive and Negative Emotions
An individual's perception that procedures are just often enhances positive emotions
and dampens negative emotions.60 Drawing on the PANAS measurement tool, a widely
employed instrument in the field of social psychology, discrete emotions were selected
and measured, across all conditions, including whether the way participants were treated
made them feel happy, proud, angry, ashamed, sad, embarrassed, depressed, distressed,,
cheated, or satisfied.6 1 When analyzing across these distinct emotions, an exploratory
factor analysis revealed a two-factor solution, which loaded onto positive and negative.
emotions. 62 Composites were, in turn, created for positive and negative emotions
(Cronbach's a = .911, .942, respectively), with higher scores indicating experiences of
greater positive and greater negative emotions.
59. For a discussion of Cronbach's alpha, see CHAVA FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS & DAVID NACHMIAS,
RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 425 (6th ed. 2000). For a discussion of Cronbach's alpha and the
test of unidimensionality, see SPSS FAQ, What Does Cronbach's alpha mean? available at
www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/faq/alpha.html.
60. See Kees van den Bos, Allan E. Lind, Riel Vermunt, & Henk A. M. Wilke, How do IJudge my Outcome
When Ido not Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1034 (1997).
61. The PANAS instrument has been cited more than 3,000 in the psychological literature. For articles that
use and discuss the PANAS, see Eddie Harmon-Jones et al., PANAS Positive Activation is Associated with Anger,
9 EMOTION 183 (2009); Boris Egloff et al., Facets of Dynamic Positive Affect: Differentiating Joy, Interest and
Activation in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 528
(2003); C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group
Improve Feelings Towards the Group? 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1997).
62. The cross-scenario two-factor solution yielded two significant eigenvalues of 6.31 and 1.84 for the
negative and positive emotions, respectively, explaining 63.1% and 18.35% of the total variation. Cumulatively
these two dimensions explained roughly 81% of the total variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic was
.893 with a significant Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (p < .001), indicating the appropriateness of the factor
analysis.
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d. LegalAccuracy .
Participants also rated the accuracy of the process (How accurate was the process
used to decide your appeal?) and the accuracy of the outcome obtained or expected (How
accurate was the outcome of your appeal?). After an exploratory factor analysis revealed
that these two items loaded onto a single factor, we averaged the two items together to
create a perceived accuracy composite (Cronbach's a = .907), with higher scores
indicating more favorable perceptions of legal accuracy. Participants randomly assigned
to the pending decision condition rated the accuracy of the process based on their
impressions of the handling of the dispute (How accurate will the outcome of your appeal
likely be?).
e. Effectiveness of Process
Participants across all conditions also rated the effectiveness of the procedures (How
effective were the procedures used to handle and decide your appeal?). Higher scores
indicated more favorable impressions about the effectiveness of the procedure.
f Legitimacy
Participants rated both process and outcome on four items-outcome legitimacy,
outcome acceptance, outcome challenge, and overall satisfaction with handling-which
assessed the perceived legitimacy of dispute resolution (How legitimate was the outcome
you received? How likely is it that you would challenge the outcome of this dispute?
Reverse Coded). We averaged the four. items together to create a legitimacy composite
(Cronbach's a = .972), with higher scores indicating greater perceived legitimacy. Only
participants who received favorable or unfavorable outcomes completed these items.
g. Manipulation and Attention Checks
After completing each legal dispute, participants answered three manipulation
checks, and at the conclusion of the experiment, participants answered one attention check.
The manipulation check ensured that participants could correctly identify whether they
were provided procedural justice (The local landlord/tenant official allowed you to provide
your input before a decision was made) and the outcome obtained (The official decided
that your eviction was improper and that you can stay in the apartment). The attention
check ensured that participants were in fact reading the materials (If you are reading this
question and have read all other questions, please select the box marked 'other' and type
'Decision Making' in the box below).
As is methodologically recommended, we excluded those who did not pass these
checks; thus the final sample consisted of N = 400 participants.
C. Results
To analyze the influence of procedural justice on these seven dependent measures,
we conducted a 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 3 (outcome: favorable,
unfavorable, pending) two-way between-subjects analysis of variance ("ANOVA") on
these seven dependent measures. On the two outcome-related dependent measures, which
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were not completed by participants randomly assigned to the pending decision condition,
we conducted a 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 2 (outcome: favorable,
unfavorable) two-way between-subjects ANOVA.
1. The Plural Effects of Procedural Justice
We investigated the influence of procedural justice on overall fairness, outcome
satisfaction, positive emotions, negative emotions, legal accuracy, effectiveness of
procedure, and legitimacy. The analytic strategy employed for each dependent measure
consisted of two-way between-subjects ANOVA, examining the influence of procedural
justice and outcome on these dependent measures. All means and standard deviations are
reported in Table 1.
a. Overall Fairness
A 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 3 (outcome: favorable, unfavorable,
pending) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of procedural justice on overall
fairness, F(1,394) = 965.48, p <.001, qp2 = .71. Consistent with prior research, participants
reported significantly more overall fairness when procedural justice was afforded (M =
6.91, SD = 2.32) than when procedural justice was withheld (M= 2.44, SD = 1.64). The
ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of dispute outcome, F(2, 394) = 700.47, p
<.001, qp' = .47, whereby those who received favorable outcomes reported more overall
fairness (M = 6.56, SD= 2.62) than both those who received unfavorable outcomes (M =
3.16, SD = 2.15), and those awaiting outcomes (M= 4.62, SD = 3.18); and a significant 2-
way interaction, F(2, 394) = 62.55, p < .001, qp2 = .14, indicating that the magnitude of
the procedural justice effect was moderated by dispute outcome.
Simple effects tests examined the effect of procedural justice for participants with
favorable, unfavorable, and pending cases separately. Procedural justice influenced overall
fairness both for members of the public who received favorable decisions, F(1, 394) =
269.78, p < .001, qp = .41, 95% CI [3.83, 4.87], and those who received unfavorable
decisions, F(1, 394) = 176.1 4 ,p < .001, qp2 = .31, 95% CI [2.67, 3.59]. Procedural justice
also shaped overall fairness for participants awaiting decisions, F(1, 394) = 592.97, p <
.001, 17p 2 = .60, 95% CI [5.31, 6.24].
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Figure 2. Mean overall fairness ratings for dispute processes in which procedural
justice is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes, unfavorable outcomes, and
decision pending. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are represented by the error
bars attached to each column.
b. Outcome Satisfaction
A 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 2 (outcome: favorable,unfavorable)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of procedural justice on outcome satisfaction,
F(1, 254) = 70.50, p < .001, Tp2 = .22, whereby participants reported significantly more
outcome satisfaction when procedural justice was afforded (M = 4.31, SD= 2.14), than
when procedural justice was withheld (M= 3.23, SD = 2.20). The ANOVA also revealed
a significant main effect of dispute outcome, F(2, 254) = 1234.83, p < .001, f, 2 = .83.
Participants who received favorable outcomes were more satisfied with their outcomes (M
= 5.98, SD = 1.00) than those who received unfavorable outcomes (M= 1.99, SD= 1.04);
and the 2-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 254) = 1.99, p = .160, r, 2 = .01,
indicating that this effect of procedural justice was not moderated by dispute outcome.
Simple effects tests examined the effect of procedural justice for participants with
favorable and unfavorable outcomes separately. Procedural justice influenced outcome
satisfaction both for participants who received favorable decisions, F(1, 254) = 21.89, p <
.001, rh) 2 = .08, 95% Cl [.46, 1.12], and for participants who received unfavorable
decisions, F(l, 254) = 5 4 .3 2 , p < .001, 1P 2 = .18, 95% CI [.81, 1.40].
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Figure 3. Mean outcome satisfaction ratings for dispute processes in which
procedural justice is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes and unfavorable
outcomes. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are represented by the error bars
attached to each column.
c. Positive and Negative Emotions
A 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 3 (outcome: favorable, unfavorable,
pending) ANOVA conducted on positive emotions and negative emotions, separately,
revealed a significant main effect of procedural justice on both positive emotions, F(1,
394) = 548.85, p < .001, rq 2 = .58, and negative emotions, F(l, 394) = 311.24, p < .001,
rqp2 = .44. When procedural justice was afforded, participants reported more positive
emotions (M= 3.56, SD = 1.83) and less negative emotions (M= 2.82, SD = 1.68) than
when procedural justice was withheld (positive emotions: M = 1.44, SD = .80; negative
emotions: M = 4.93, SD = 1.22). The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of
dispute outcome on both positive emotions, F(2, 394) = 199.34, p < .001, lpp2 = .50, and
negative emotions, F(2, 394) = 85.03, p < .001, %2 = .30, whereby those who received
favorable outcomes reported more positive emotions and less negative emotions (positive
emotions: M= 3.76, SD = 1.95; negative emotions: M= 2.96, SD = 1.73) than both those
who received unfavorable outcomes (positive emotions: M = 1.44, SD = .74; negative
emotions: M = 4.87, SD = 1.27) and those awaiting outcomes (positive emotions: M =
2.53, SD = 1.67, negative emotions: M= 3.63, SD= 1.85). Moreover, the 2-way interaction
was significant for both positive emotions, F(2, 394) = 77.42, p < .001, rqj 2 = .28, and
negative emotions, F(2, 394) = 27.19, p < .00 1, %p2 = .12, indicating that the influence of
procedural justice on positive and negative emotions was moderated by dispute outcome.
Simple effects tests examined the effect of procedural justice for participants with
favorable, unfavorable, and pending outcomes separately. For participants who received
favorable decisions, procedural justice influenced positive emotions, F(1, 394) = 361.40,
p < .001, p2 = .48, 95% CI [2.94, 3.62], and negative emotions, F(l, 394) = 125.78, p <
1292018]
TULSA LAWREVIEW
.001, jPp2 = .24, 95% CI [-2.92, -2.05]. For those who received unfavorable decisions
procedural justice also influenced positive emotions, F(l, 394) = 14.95, p < .001, lIp 2 -
.04, 95% CI [.29, .90], and negative emotions, F(1, 394) = 21.85, p <.001, 4,2 = .05, 95%
CI [-1.31, -.53]. For participants awaiting decisions, procedural justice had an even larger
effect on positive emotions, F(1, 394) = 291.42, p <.001, rn, 2 =.43, 95% CI [2.33, 2.94],
and negative emotions, F(1, 394) = 291.42, p <.001, Tlp 2 = .43, 95% CI [-3.28, -2.50].
MProcedural Justice Afforded E Procedural Justice Withheld
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Figure 4. Mean positive emotion ratings for dispute processes in which procedural
justice is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes, unfavorable outcomes, and
decision pending. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are represented by the error
bars attached to each column.
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Figure 5. Mean negative emotion ratings for dispute processes in which procedural
justice is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes, unfavorable outcomes, and
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decision pending. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are represented by the error
bars attached to each column.
d. Legal Accuracy
A 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 3 (outcome: favorable, unfavorable,
pending) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of procedural justice on perceived
legal accuracy, F(1, 394) = 677.53, p < .001, ip2 = .63, whereby participants reported
significantly greater legal accuracy when procedural justice was afforded (M = 5.00, SD =
1.41) than when procedural justice was withheld (M= 2.42, SD = 1.33). The ANOVA also
revealed a significant main effect of dispute outcome, F(2, 394) = 184.40, p < .001, rpp2 =
.48, whereby those who received favorable outcomes reported significantly greater legal
accuracy (M= 5.09, SD = 1.39) than both those who received unfavorable outcomes (M=
2.76, SD = 1.43) and those awaiting decisions (M= 3.54, SD = 1.98); and a significant 2-
way interaction, F(2, 394) = 27.88, p < .001, il 2 = .12, indicating that the effect of
procedural justice on legal accuracy was moderated by dispute outcome.
Simple effects tests examined the effect of procedural justice on perceived legal
accuracy for participants with favorable, unfavorable, and pending outcomes separately.
Procedural justice significantly influenced legal accuracy both for participants who
received favorable decisions, F(l, 394) = 121.96, p <.001, in,2 = .24, 95% CI [1.63, 2.34],
and for those who received unfavorable decisions, F(1, 394) = 162.45, p <.001, 1q1p2 = .29,
95% Cl [1.73, 2.36]. Procedural justice appeared to have an even larger effect on legal
accuracy for participants awaiting decisions, F(l, 394) = 475.70, p < .001, qp 2 = .55, 95%
CI [3.20, 3.83].
gProcedural Justice Affoided OProcedural Justice Withheld
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Figure 6. Mean legal accuracy ratings for dispute processes in which procedural
justice is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes, unfavorable outcomes, and
decision pending. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are represented by the error
bars attached to each column.
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e. Effectiveness of Process
A 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 3 (outcome: favorable, unfavorable,
pending) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of procedural justice on perceived
effectiveness of process, F(1, 394) = 886.38, p < .001, TI, 2 = .69. Participants reported
significantly greater effectiveness of process when procedural justice was afforded (M =
5.11, SD = 1.44) than when procedural justice was withheld (M = 1.98, SD = 1.12). The
ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of dispute outcome, F(2, 394) = 96.24, p
< .001, T, 2 = .33, whereby those who received favorable outcomes reported significantly
greater effectiveness of process (M = 4.58, SD = 1.95) than both those who received
unfavorable outcomes (M= 2.71, SD = 1.58) and those awaiting decisions (M= 3.51, SD
= 2.11); and a significant 2-way interaction, F(2, 394) = 16.03, p < .001, i, 2 = .08,
indicating that the influence of procedural justice on the perceived effectiveness of process
was moderated by dispute outcome.
Simple effects tests again examined the effect of procedural justice for participants
with favorable, unfavorable, and pending outcomes separately. Procedural justice
influenced perceptions of the effectiveness of procedure both for participants who received
favorable decisions, F(l, 394) = 266.82, p < .001, rp 2 = .40, 95% CI [2.79, 3.55], and for
those who received unfavorable decisions, F(1, 394) = 189.20, p <.001, rp2 =.32, 95% Cl
[2.04, 2.72]. Procedural justice appeared to have a slightly larger effect on perceived
effectiveness of process for participants awaiting decisions, F(l, 394) = 468.02, p <.001,
P= .54, 95% Cl [3.42, 4.11].
UProcedural Justice Afforded DProcedural Justice Withheld
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Figure 7. Mean effectiveness of process ratings for dispute processes in which
procedural justice is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes, unfavorable
outcomes, and decision pending. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are represented
by the error bars attached to each column.
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f Legitimacy
A 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 2 (outcome: favorable, unfavorable)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of procedural justice on the perceived
legitimacy of dispute resolution, F(1, 254) = 127.83, p < .001, lp 2 = .36. Consistent with
prior literature on procedural justice, participants reported significantly more legitimacy
when procedural justice was afforded (M= 4.55, SD = 1.93) than when procedural justice
was withheld (M= 3.30, SD = 1.93). The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect
of dispute outcome, F(1, 254) = 1203.20, p < .001, flp2 = .83, whereby those who received
favorable outcomes reported significantly more legitimacy (M= 5.89, SD= .90) than those
who received unfavorable outcomes (M= 2.33, SD = 1.06); and that the 2-way interaction
was not significant, F(l, 254) = .84, p = .360, m2 = .00, indicating that the effect of
procedural justice on legitimacy was not moderated by dispute outcome.
Simple effects tests examined the effect of procedural justice for participants with
favorable and unfavorable outcomes separately. Procedural justice had a significant effect
on perceived legitimacy of dispute resolution both for participants who received favorable
decisions, F(1, 254) ='48.42, p < .001, r, 2 = .16, 95% Cl [.76, 1.35], and for those who.
received unfavorable decisions, F(1, 254) = 84.38, p < .001, rp 2 = .25, 95% CI [.97, 1.50].
*Procedural Justice Afforded 0IProcedural Justice Withheld
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Figure 8. Mean legitimacy ratings for dispute processes in which procedural justice
is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes and unfavorable outcomes. Ninety-five
percent confidence intervals are represented by the error bars attached to each column.
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and 95% CIfor Measures
Procedural Justice Afforded Procedural Justice Withheld
Dependent
Measure n M(SD) 95% CI n M(SD) 95% CI
Overall Fairness
Favorable Outcome 57 8.73 (1.35)a [8.38, 9.09] 57 4.39 (1.54)b [3.98, 4.80]
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Unfavorable Outcome 68
Dispute Pending 73
Outcome Satisfaction
Favorable Outcome 57
Unfavorable Outcome 68
Positive Emotions
Favorable Outcome 57
Unfavorable Outcome 68
Dispute Pending 73
Negative Emotions
Favorable Outcome 57
Unfavorable Outcome 68
Dispute Pending 73
Legal Accuracy
Favorable Outcome 57
Unfavorable Outcome 68
Dispute Pending 73
Effectiveness of Process
Favorable Outcome 57
Unfavorable Outcome 68
Dispute Pending 73
Legitimacy
Favorable Outcome 57
Unfavorable Outcome 68
4.81 (1.93)a
7.43 (1.67)a
[4.35, 5.28]
[7.04, 7.82]
76
69
6.37 (.79)a [6.17, 6.58] 57
2.57 (1.12)a [2.30, 2.84] 76
5.40 (1.00)a
1.75 (.85)a
3.81 (1.39)a
1.71 (1.02)a
4.38 (1.30)a
2.22 (1.31)a
6.08 (.91)a
3.84 (1.23)a
5.25 (1.07)a
6.16 (.90)a
3.97 (1.29)a
5.34 (1.14)a
[5.13, 5.67]
[1.55, 1.96]
[3.48, 4.13)
[1.44, 1.99]
[4.07, 4.70]
[1.92, 2.53]
[5.84, 6.33]
[3.54, 4.13]
[5.00, 5.50]
[5.92, 6.40]
[3.66, 4.28]
[5.08, 5.61]
57
76
69
57
76
69
57
76
69
57
76
69
6.42 (.70)a [6.23, 6.60] 57
2.99 (1.04)a [2.74, 3.241 76
Note. Means on the same row with unlike subscripts different at alpha < .05.
g. Discussion
This empirical legal study experimentally examined the effect of procedural justice
on experiences and perceptions of overall fairness, outcome satisfaction, positive
emotions, negative emotions, legal accuracy, effectiveness ofprocess, and legitimacy. The
findings support the primary hypothesis that procedural justice broadly influences the way
that Americans think, feel, and experience civil justice. Consistent with prior literature and
theory, regardless of whether a favorable outcome is obtained, when procedural justice is
withheld, perceptions and experiences across all seven dependent measures are diminished
and eroded. Conversely, regardless of whether an unfavorable outcome is obtained, when
procedural justice is afforded, perceptions and experiences of all seven dependent
measures are improved and fostered. The study also reveals that outcomes matter: the
extent to which outcomes are favorable or unfavorable influence perceptions and
experiences across these dependent measures. Even so, procedural justice influenced these
1.68 (.91)b
1.65 (.77)b
5.59 (1.04)b
1.47 (.59)b
2.12 (1.08)b
1.16 (.48)b
1.17 (.33)b
4.20 (l.36)b
5.30 (1.07)b
5.11 (.98)b
4.10 (1.03)b
1.79 (.76)b
1.73 (.68)b
2.99 (1.32)b
1.59 (.77)b
1.58 (.67)b
5.36 (.75)b
1.75 (.68)b
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[1.05, 1.27]
[1.09, 1.25]
[3.84, 4.56]
[5.06, 5.55]
[4.88, 5.35]
[3.83, 4.37]
[1.62,1.97]
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[1.42, 1.74]
[5.16, 5.56]
[1.59, 1.901
HUMAN-CENTERED CIVIL JUSTICE DESIGN
perceptions and experiences independent of the outcomes obtained in the legal disputes.
One of the strengths of this study is that these effects were explored with a voter-
eligible, U.S. adult sample-a population likely to encounter the civil justice system in the
role of plaintiff or defendant. It is vital to learn how different levels of procedural justice
afforded affect ordinary members of the American public's thoughts, feelings, and their
experiences within the civil justice system.
2. Fundamental Experiences of Justice
We next investigated our second hypothesis: the extent to which these broad and
plural influences of procedural justice can be explained by a single latent factor. Our prior
analysis supported the first hypothesis that procedural justice powerfully influences the
experiences of the public across all seven dependent measures. Therefore, we tested our
second hypothesis by examining whether the plural effects on these seven dependent
measures correlated with one another. After establishing the inter-item correlation, we then
conducted confirmatory factor and exploratory factor analyses to test the extent to which
these seven measures form a single composite and load onto a single latent factor.
Ultimately, we concluded that these seven measures, in fact, converge on a single
underlying factor-fundamental experiences of justice. Our analytic strategy then entailed
conducting a two-way between-subjects ANOVA to examine the influence of procedural
justice on fundamental experiences of justice.
a. Plural Effects Converge: Fundamental Experiences of Justice
To begin, Table 2 reveals the inter-item correlation between these seven dependent
measures. As can be observed, the variables are highly correlated, with all but two inter-
item correlations rising above .680. This indicates that the psychological experiences
reflected by these dependent measures are highly correlated.
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Between Plural Effects of Procedural Justice
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Overall Fairness -
2. Outcome 0.804** -
Satisfaction
3. Positive 0.809** 0.700**Emotions
4. Negative 0.761** 0.604** 0.764** 
-Emotions (rx)
5. Perceived 0.953** 0.839** 0.761** 0.722** 
-Accuracy
6. Effective 0.949** 0.691** 0.762** 0.726** 04-Procedure 0.946*
7. Legitimacy 0.828** 0.966** 0.734** 0.660** 0.857** 0.737** -
Note. Negative emotions reversed coded. **p < .01
Next, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis, which revealed a Cronbach's a
of .956. This evidences a high reliability that these items reflect and map onto an
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underlying psychological construct. As such, we then conducted an exploratory factor
analysis, which revealed that all seven dependent measures are explained by a single
underlying factor. The cross-scenario solution yielded one significant eigenvalue of 5.67
for all seven measures, respectively, cumulatively explaining 80.92% ofthe total variation.
The KMO statistic was .864 with a significant Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (p < .001),
indicating the appropriateness of the factor analysis.
b. Fundamental Experiences ofJustice
A 2 (procedural justice: present, absent) x 3 (outcome: favorable, unfavorable,
pending) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of procedural justice on experiences
of justice, F(l, 394) = 1033.96, p < .001, 1,2 = .72. Participants reported significantly
greater fundamental experiences of justice when procedural justice was afforded (M =
5.09, SD = 1.62) than when procedural justice was withheld (M= 2.35, SD= 1.11). The
ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of dispute outcome, F(2, 394) = 307.63, p
< .001, 4 2 = .61, whereby those who received favorable outcomes reported significantly
greater experiences of justice (M = 5.17, SD = 1.56) than both those who received
unfavorable outcomes (M= 2.53, SD = 1.17) and those awaiting decisions (M= 3.71, SD
= 2.06). It also revealed a significant 2-way interaction, F(2, 394) = 52.51, p < .001, lp 2
.21, indicating that the influence of procedural justice on experiences of justice was
moderated by dispute outcome.
Simple effects tests examined the effect of procedural justice for participants with
favorable, unfavorable, and pending outcomes separately. Procedural justice influenced
fundamental experiences ofjustice for both participants who received favorable decisions,
F(1, 394) = 293.87, p < .001, ,2 = .43, 95% CI [2.37, 2.98], and for those who received
unfavorable decisions, F(l, 394) = 148.66, p < .001, II, 2 = .27, 95% CI [1.42, 1.97].
Procedural justice had an even larger effect on experiences of justice for participants
awaiting decisions, F(1, 394) = 705.99, p < .001, 7P 2 = .64, 95% CI [3.44, 3.99].
We chose to directly test whether the effect of procedural justice on experiences of
justice was greater for those awaiting decisions as compared to those who had received
either favorable or unfavorable decisions. The interaction contrast indicated that this was
again the case, F(1, 394) = 76.91, p < .001, T,2 = .16, 95% CI [2.38, 3.75]. 63 These results
reveal that both procedural justice and distributive justice shape fundamental experiences
of justice, a finding observed in analogous studies of procedural justice. 64
63. This difference in effect may be attributable to the difference between pre-decisional emotions and post-
decisional emotions. While all participants were, in effect, asked to report their anticipated emotions in these
scenarios, the participants in the ex-ante condition were awaiting the outcome of the disputes, while the
participants in the outcome conditions knew the outcome, whether favorable or not. See generally Daniel
Vastfjall & Paul Slovic, Cognition and Emotion in Judgment and Decision Making, HANDBOOK OF COGNITION
& EMOTION 252 (Michael D. Robinson et al. eds., 2013).
64. See Emily C. Bianchi et al., Trust in Decision-Making Authorities Dictates the Form of the Interactive
Relationship Between Outcome Fairness and Procedural Fairness, 41 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL.
19 (2014); Jason A. Colquitt, Jerald Greenberg, & Cindy P. Zapata-Phelan, What is Organizational Justice: A
Historical Overview, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 3 (Jerald Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds.,
2005).
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EProcedural Justice Afforded MProcedural Justice Withheld
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Favorable Outcome Unfavorable Outcome Dispute Pending
Figure 9. Mean fundamental experiences of justice ratings for dispute processes in
which procedural justice is either present or absent, by favorable outcomes, unfavorable
outcomes, and decision pending. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are represented
by the error bars attached to each column.
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and 95% CIfor Fundamental Experience of Justice
Procedural Justice Afforded Procedural Justice Withheld
Dependent
Measure n M(SD) 95% CI n M(SD) 95% CI
Fundamental Experience ofJustice
Favorable Outcome 57 6.51 (.80)a [6.29, 6.72] 57 3.83 (.81)b [3.62, 4.05]
Unfavorable Outcome 68 3.43 (1.01)a [3.18, 3.67] 76 1.73 (.55)b [1.60, 1.861
Dispute Pending 73 5.52 (1.15)a [5.25, 5.79] 69 1.80 (.47)b [1.69, 1.92]
Note. Means on the same row with unlike subscripts different at alpha <.05.
c. Discussion
This second aspect of the empirical legal study examined the extent to which the
plural effects of procedural justice on experiences and perceptions of overall fairness,
outcome satisfaction, positive emotions, negative emotions, legal accuracy, effectiveness
of process, and legitimacy converge on a single underlying factor. Consistent with our
second hypothesis, the findings reveal that procedural justice powerfully influenced the
participant's fundamental experiences of justice. Again, regardless of whether favorable
or unfavorable outcomes are obtained, when procedural justice is withheld, fundamental
experiences of justice diminished and eroded. Conversely, when procedural justice is
afforded, fundamental experiences of justice were improved and fostered. This effect is
even starker for participants who are participating in dispute resolution and who await the
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outcome of their dispute. The analysis reveals that outcomes matter: the extent to which
outcomes are favorable or unfavorable influence experiences of justice. Even so,
procedural justice influenced fundamental experiences of justice independent of the
outcomes obtained in these legal disputes.
Regarding potential limitations of this empirical study, we varied procedural justice
by simultaneously altering the following dimensions of procedural justice: voice and an
opportunity to be heard, a neutral and trustworthy decision maker, and being treated with
dignity and respect. However, varying one of these attributes at a time, or a cluster of
several of these attributes together rather than all at once, may alter the public's experience
of procedural justice as well. Moreover, this particular study used self-report measures. In
the future, we will harness psycho-physiological equipment, such as galvanic skin
response and cortisol measurements, to measure the public's experiences of justice.
Further, in this phase of the research, we employed experimentally manipulated vignettes.
While experiments that harness vignettes have high internal validity, these vignette studies
may lack in external validity. Nonetheless, recent meta-analysis suggests that, when
studying procedural justice, the effect sizes observed in the lab and field are comparable. 65
In the future, we aim to bridge from lab studies to field studies that harness psycho-
physiological measures.
III. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This empirical legal study explored whether procedural justice influences the way
the American public thinks about, feels, and experiences civil justice. The analysis
presented in Part II reveals that procedural justice broadly shapes perceptions and
experiences-including overall fairness, outcome satisfaction, emotions, perceptions of
legal accuracy, perceptions of procedural effectiveness, and the perceived legitimacy of
dispute resolution-which closely relate to the process values and aims that the civil
justice system seeks to foster. Moreover, the study demonstrates that when procedural
justice is withheld the public's perceptions and experiences ofjustice erode and diminish.
This is of marked significance-procedural justice has a powerful and plural effect,
simultaneously promoting many of the process values and aims of the civil justice system,
including legitimacy. These plural effects, moreover, converge on an underlying factor-
fundamental experiences of justice. 66 Finally, the empirical study demonstrates that
whether a result is experienced as just (outcome satisfaction) is powerfully shaped by
65. Yochi Cohen-Charash & Paul E. Spector, The Role of Justice in Organizations: A Meta-Analysis, 86
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 278, 301 (2001).
66. See, DAVID DE CREMER, ADVANCES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE AND AFFECT, (2007); David De
Cremer & Kees van den Bos, Justice and Feelings: Toward a New Era in Justice Research, 20 SOC. JUST. RES.
1 (2007); Craig A. Smith & Richard S. Lazarus, Appraisal Components, Core Relational Themes, and the
Emotions,7 COGNITION & EMOTION 233 (1993) (revealing that the experience of anger may result primarily from
perceived injustice); ROBERT FOLGER, ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT,
(1998) ("[fleeling unfairly treated by someone or some institution gives anger a direction, a target-namely a
person or organization held accountable for the perceived injustice."); Robert J. Bies, The Predicament of
Injustice: The Management of Moral Outrage, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (L.L. Cummings
& Barry M. Staw eds., 1987); J.S. Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berowitzed., ed., 1965) (arguing that inequity results in an unpleasant state of anger); GEORGE
G.C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FoRMs (1961) (injustice leads one to display negative
emotion of anger).
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whether procedural justice is afforded to the public.
Importantly, procedural justice is a powerful means of realizing the plural values
that the civil justice system seeks to promote. As such, the extent to which members of the
public experience justice within the civil justice system shouldbe closely and continuously
measured. Civil processes that afford procedural justice ultimately shape beliefs about
whether the civil justice system is fair, legitimate, and just. Thus, how the public
experiences the civil justice system powerfully shapes the basic sense of justice that the
public expects and demands.
As a result, experiences of justice should be more explicitly woven into normative
accounts that seek to improve the effectiveness of the civil justice system. Legal
professionals, including judges and court administrators, should evaluate how the public
experiences different legal processes and procedures. 67 Fundamentally, legal professionals
must strive to avoid legal processes and procedures that erode the public's experiences of
justice, regardless of whether these legal processes and procedures are arguably efficient. 68
Below, we contend that legal professionals can and should harness the diagnostic
and feedback potential of experiences of justice when engaging in human-centered civil
justice design. Legal professionals can and should measure and evaluate the public's.
experiences of justice as the public navigates the civil justice system. Moreover, when the
public overwhelmingly negatively experiences a particular legal process or procedure as
manifestly unjust civil justice designers should intervene. We must modify the legal
environment by adopting legal procedures that dissipate the public's negative experiences
and restore the public's fundamental experiences of justice. Our recommendation casts
light on harnessing procedural justice as a means of advancing the aims and values of the
civil justice system and has implications for judges and court administrators, a matter to
which we now turn.
A. Illuminating the Plural Effects of Procedural Justice on Process Values
Considered with previous psychological science research, the experiment reported
in Part II, casts light on a powerful means for advancing the plural aims and process values
of the civil justice system. Research on procedural justice illuminates the plural ends of
the civil justice system and offers an important means for selecting among different civil
processes and dueling constructions of rules of civil procedure. When engaging in civil
justice design, legal professionals should measure, evaluate, and ultimately incorporate the
extent to which the public experiences proposed legal processes as legitimate and just.
While efficiency is a desirable value, designing an effective civil justice system requires
that we ensure the public experiences civil justice as fair, legitimate, and procedurally just.
To begin, one. of the accepted ends of the civil justice system is deterrence. When
debating the desirability of particular procedures, however, discussion often surrounds
whether these procedures result in over or under-deterrence. The empirical legal study
reported in Part 1I reveals that one of the plural effects of procedural justice is perceived
legal accuracy. When procedural justice is withdrawn, perceptions of legal accuracy
67. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN L.
REV. 155 (2007); Kahan, supra note 52, at 898-99.
68. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS, WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE (2013).
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diminish, whereas when procedural justice is afforded, perceptions of legal accuracy
improve. This finding is important: according to Bentham's theory of deterrence, optimal
levels of societal deterrence are driven by expectations about the efficacy and accuracy of
legal process. Mainly, when the public believes that the civil justice system will accurately
hold wrongdoers accountable, then optimal levels of societal deterrence are promoted.
These expectations about legal accuracy, in turn, promote compliance with law. Secondly,
some proposed procedures may arguably result in comparable levels of societal deterrence.
In this scenario, civil justice designers should evaluate whether the public experiences one
or more of the proposed procedures as unjust. For example, federal courts may choose to
allow or deny oral arguments before ruling on a motion for summary judgment. In theory,
either approach yields similar levels of societal deterrence. Yet depriving claimants of a
voice and opportunity to be heard before granting summary judgment may result in
experiences of procedural injustice and, therefore, threaten the perceived legitimacy of
dispute resolution.
Another of the accepted ends of the civil justice system is effectuation values. Legal
professionals often equate this aim with monetary relief.69 While the basic economic
model of litigation is informative and useful, 70 the model neglects litigant emotions and
experiences. One of the plural effects of procedural justice is on perceived procedural
effectiveness. That is, when the public experiences procedural injustice, the public
perceives procedures as ineffective, whereas when the public experiences procedural
justice, the public perceives procedures as effective. Here too, both whether legally
cognizable rights are being enforced and perceptions of whether legally cognizable rights
are being enforced by the civil justice system are significant. As Abrams has argued,
emotions and the mobilization of rights are related. 7 1 Indeed, naming, blaming, and
claiming, and the dispute pyramid, can be conceived of in terms of emotions and
experiences. 72 Research on procedural justice offers a bases for understanding the
dynamics of claiming behavior and how procedural rules affect the emotions that intersect
with claiming behavior. 73 When evaluating the effectuation of rights, legal professionals
should consider diminished perceptions of the ineffectiveness of process, negative
emotions, and experiences of injustice that stem from being denied meaningful legal
process and relief.
Our civil justice system also strives to promote participation and dignity values. 74
These twin aims reflect a deep humanistic appreciation for an engaged democracy that
treats people with dignity and respect. These twin values also reflect concern for the
psychological harm, humiliation, and loss of self-respect suffered when meaningful
69. See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING
THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 209 (2012); Tamara Relis, "It's
Not About the Money!"A Theory ofMisconceptions ofPlaintiff's Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701 (2007).
70. Priest & Klein, supra note 34.
71. See Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights,, 46 HARV. L. REV. 551 (2011).
72. Id. at 535; see also JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT, et al., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW, 25, Chapter
(2016).
73. Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science of
Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1006-09 (2014).
74. Michelman, supra note 5, 1173-75;
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opportunities to redress harm are denied. 75 In the past, the primary difficulty of promoting
these twin aims has been measuring and evaluating humanistic concerns, including the
public's experiences of justice. This difficulty relates to philosophical tension between
rationalism and empiricism. 76 Yet psychological science on procedural justice creates
common ground between rationalism and empiricism by revealing powerful new empirical
methods for measuring and evaluating experiences of justice. Importantly, the plural
effects of procedural justice converge on a single underlying factor: fundamental
experiences of justice. That is, when procedural justice is afforded the public experiences
fundamental justice; when procedural justice is withheld, the public experiences
fundamental injustice. Today, the methods are readily available for legal professionals to
measure and evaluate whether proposed rules affect the twin aims of participation and
dignity.
Another important process value is efficiency.77 The difficulty, however, is that
efficiency equates with diminishing the direct costs of court procedures and reducing
delay, which can work at cross purposes with affording procedural justice. 78 These direct
costs are home by claimants, defendants, and the public, and any cost savings may inure
to the benefit of all or only some of these interested parties. Reformists often contend that
access to judicial forums should be scaled back to avoid undue direct costs (or the cost of
defending against litigation). This contention unfortunately neglects whether members of
the public experience this diminished civil justice as illegitimate and unjust. In this regard,
the public resists cost savings if these cost savings require trading off procedural justice
for procedural injustice. 79 Cheaper for some may not be experienced as fairer to most.
Legal professionals must be cautious when promoting efficiency (i.e., reducing
direct costs or delays) in the civil justice system. Efficiency may conflict with procedural
justice, perceived legitimacy, and civil justice effectiveness. For example, procedural
justice shapes whether the public accepts judges, mediators, and courts as legitimate. 80
This perceived legitimacy is vital to a vibrant democracy: the legitimacy of legal
institutions and promoting voluntary compliance with law and pro-social cooperation in
an engaged democracy. 81 This wellspring of legitimacy influences the public's
willingness to comply with legal decrees. Accordingly, when the public reacts negatively
to diminished processes, these negative reactions signal that a civil process is experienced
as procedurally unjust. These experiences of procedural injustice suggest that the
legitimacy of the civil justice system is being damaged. This loss of legitimacy is itself a
cost and consequence that should be thoughtfully considered and avoided when engaging
75. Id. at 1172; Mashaw, supra note 7, at 50-5 1.
76. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 4, 20 (2003) ("[I]n
philosophy we have a very similar contrast expressed in the pair of terms "rationalist" and empiricist . .
77. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure, supra note 6, at 400-02.
78. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, et al., DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN: PREVENTING, MANAGING, AND RESOLVING
CONFLICT (forthcoming on file with author); David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics
Be Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 380 (2002).
79. See generally Quintanilla, Taboo Procedural Tradeoffs: Examining How the Public Experiences
Tradeoffs Between Procedural Justice and Cost, 15 NEV. L.J. 882 (2015).
80. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, supra note 11, at 379.
81. See supra Part I.B. 1; see Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, supra note
12, at 379.
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in efficient and effective civil justice design. Civil justice designers should consider the
plural advantages of a procedurally just system, while at the same time considering the
plural disadvantages of a procedurally unjust system, when evaluating ways of realizing
cost and time efficiencies. 82
Moreover, procedural justice also advances the value of equality, which the civil
justice system aspires to promote. Equality reflects concern with whether civil processes
result in different outcomes to particular classes of parties. Drawing on John Rawl's
Theory ofJustice,83 from behind a veil of ignorance, one would accomplish civil justice
design that promotes overall experience of fairness and justice to all parties regardless of
whether they ultimately receive favorable or unfavorable outcomes. From behind the veil
of ignorance, one would know neither whether one is a plaintiff or a defendant, nor whether
one's case will ultimately prevail. Hence, regardless of a party's outcome-favorable or
unfavorable-procedural justice promotes perceptions of fairness and experiences of
justice. That is, procedural justice improves experiences of fairness and justice to both
plaintiffs and defendants, whether they ultimately succeed or not. All parties benefit when
procedural justice is afforded. Secondly, procedural justice fostered the greatest collective
good to the parties: the combined fairness to parties in the procedural justice condition was
far greater ([Favorable: M = 8.73 + Unfavorable: M = 4.81] = 13.54) than the combined
fairness to parties in the procedural injustice condition ([Favorable: M = 4.39 +
Unfavorable: M = 1.68] = 6.07). Similarly, the combined overall experience of justice to
parties in the procedural justice condition was far greater ([Favorable: M = 6.51 +
Unfavorable: M= 3.43] = 9.94) than the combined overall experience of justice to parties
in the procedural injustice condition ([Favorable: M = 3.83 + Unfavorable: M = 1.73] =
5.56). Further, when disputes are pending within the civil justice system, all parties benefit
from increased procedural justice. In marked contrast, when special interest groups
advocate procedures that are experienced as procedurally unjust to skew results in their
favor, this form of civil justice reform fails the test of equality.
In sum, legal culture should harness psychological science on procedural justice as
an important means to promote the plural ends of the civil justice system when selecting
among civil processes, rules of procedure, and dueling constructions of rules. While
efficiency is desirable, procedural justice is vital for achieving an effective civil justice
system. Chiefly, when selecting between legal procedures, civil justice designers should
measure and evaluate the public's experiences of justice. We must strive for fair and
appropriate legal procedures that are procedurally just and which diminish experiences of
procedural injustice.
B. Implications for Judges and Court Administrators
Our legal culture should reflect professionalism in civil justice design that seeks to
openly and transparently reconcile the different plural values of the civil justice system
and stakeholder concerns. Judges and court administrators should not promote a legal
culture that strives only for efficiency-they should promote a legal culture that attends to
82. For a general discussion of the importance of procedural justice, see Lind & Tyler, Procedural Justice,
supra note 17.
83. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
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the procedural justice afforded by formal and informal civil processes and how these civil
processes influence experiences of justice. 84 Courts should be mindful of the public's
experiences of procedural justice and harness empirical methods to evaluate how features
of formal procedures and informal practices shape the public's experience, including
experiences of justice. As David B. Rottman of the National Center for State Courts
("NCSC") has argued, procedural fairness is the "organizing theory for which twenty-first
century court reform has been waiting." 85 In this regard, we offer two recommendations
below: first, on the judge's role for handling individual cases; and second, on judges' and
court administrators' responsibility to evaluate and improve upon the public's justice-
related experiences across cases.
Doubtless, courts must ensure that the public experiences dispute-handling
procedures as fair and adopt procedures that afford litigants respect. In each adjudicated
case, courts should attend to the interpersonal dimensions of dispute resolution to promote
experiences of justice. Courts should, therefore, actively and mindfully appraise and
monitor the experiences of disputants across cases. Judges and court administrators can
lend litigants and courthouse visitors the opportunity to evaluate their experiences before
leaving the courthouse. 86 Courthouse administrators can evaluate the tone of public
interaction set in their courthouses, as Minnesota courts have done for a number of years. 87
Court administrators, moreover, can partner with researchers to conduct collaborative
projects to assess procedural fairness in courts. In this regard, the NCSC has designed and
made available an excellent survey tool that measures experiences of access and fairness.88
California's and Utah's recent court assessment projects on trust and confidence are
excellent examples. 89
Above all, when courts become aware that a wide swath of litigants experience a
particular rule or practice as unjust, this should prompt discussion on judicial committees
of whether intervention, such as by altering a procedural rule or process, is called for. To
begin, we should encourage judicial training on the psychology of procedural justice and
how to attend to experiences of justice. Capacities such as empathy can be learned,
developed, and refined.90 Courts should be trained on how to perceive, interpret, and
appraise the experiences of litigants. 9 1 Courts, for example, can be trained in mindfulness
practices, which over the past three decades have been recognized for the ability to reduce
84. See generally Bettina Lange, The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation, 29 J. L. & SOC'Y 197 (2002).
85. David B. Rottman, Procedural Fairness as a Court Reform Agenda, 44 CT. REV. 32 (2007).
86. Burke & Leben, supra note 134, at 20.
87. Id. at 19.
88. See National Center for State Courts, Trial Court Performance Measures, COURTOOLS (2005),
http://www.courtools.org/Trial-Court-Performance-Measures.aspx.
89. See Denton, supra note 134, at 44; David B Rottman et al., Trust and Confidence in the California Courts:
A Survey of the Public and Attorneys, Part I: Findings and Recommendations (2005),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4_37pubtrustl.pdf; Steve Leben, Considering Procedural-Fairness
Concepts in the Courts of Utah (2011), http://www.proceduralfairness.org/Resources/-/media/Microsites/Files/
procedural-faimess/Utah%20Courts%20and%2OProcedural%2OFaimess%2009-201 .ashx.
90. See Bandes & Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 161, 171-72; Norma Deitch
Feshbach and Seymour Feshbach, Empathy and Education, THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY 85 (Jean
Cecety & William Ickes ed., 2009).
91. See Bandes & Blumenthal, supra note 144, at 172-75; Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit
Measures in Social Cognition Research: The Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 300-01 (2003).
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psychological distress. 92 In short, courts interact with the public day in and day out; thus,
courts have the responsibility not only to decide individual cases at bar, but to collect and
improve the workings of the civil justice system by actively monitoring the public's
experiences of procedural justice.
For federal courts these best practices are even more urgent and necessary. Chief
Justice Roberts construes Rule I as imposing an express obligation on judges, lawyers,
and clients to work cooperatively to control the expense and time demands of litigation. 93
This will doubtless entail difficulty. Courts must remain vigilant to ensure that procedural
justice is the primary experience that is achieved by Rule 1, and that concerns for prompt
and efficient dispute resolutions do not come at the expense of ensuring that parties feel
that they have been treated fairly, legitimately, and justly.
Moreover, judges will need to be vigilant about how they employ Rule 16 when
resolving pre-trial motions. Chief Justice Roberts remarked, "[a] well-timed scowl from
the trial judge can go a long way to moving things along crisply." The difficulty is that the
well-timed scowl can also lead to experiences of procedural injustice and erode legitimacy.
Again, a healthy vigilance for experiences of justice is necessary.
C. Human-Centered Design and Managerial Judging
Human-centered design thinking seeks to deeply understand the people one intends
to serve. Design thinkers consider the behavior, environments, and psychology of their
intended beneficiaries. This approach to problem solving examines solutions with respect
to three criteria: technological feasibility, financial viability, and desirability of the
solution to the community's stakeholders. 94 Problem solving using human-centered design
consists of three stages: inspiration (the opportunity motivating change); ideation
(brainstorming and prototyping); and implementation (wherein the best ideas are scaled up
and put into a concrete plan of action).9 5 By utilizing human-centered design principles
when engaging with the civil justice system, designers, administrators, and judges can
reconcile tensions and serve the plural ends of the civil justice system.
These plural ends along with the plural effects of procedural justice have broad
implications for a variety of facets of civil justice. In particular, the principles of human-
centered civil justice design have much to do with the practice of managerial judging.9 6
The federal judicial role has shifted over time from an adversarial model in which judges
serve as impartial arbiters, to a quasi-inquisitorial model in which judges deploy
bureaucratic logics of efficiency, speed, cost, calendars, and disposition statistics. 97 As
92. See Norman A.S. Farb et. al, Mindlidness Interventions and Emotion Regulation, HANDBOOK OF
EMOTION REGULATION, 204-226 (James J. Gross, ed., 2007).
93. See CJ. Roberts, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015).
94. Tim Brown, CHANGE BY DESIGN (2009); IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN (2015).
95. Brest, Roumani & Bade, Problem Solving, Human-Centered Design, and Strategic Processes, STAN.
CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AND Clv. SOC'Y (2015), http://pacscenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
Download-the-fulI-article-here.pdfnote.
96. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982); Robert F. Peckham, The
Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV.
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Steven Yeazell has noted, "Courts now devote the bulk of their civil work to such pretrial
tasks: ruling on discovery disputes, deciding joinder issues, conducting pretrial and
settlement conferences, and sadly, punishing lawyers for misbehavior during the phase." 9 8
Federal judges have wide discretion when carrying out their role as managerial
judges and interacting with parties and their lawyers, but the constraints that circumscribe
this power are largely absent.99 Indeed, there are no explicit standards, norms, or criteria
that guide judges in how to engage in managerial judging. 100 Further, given the ubiquity
of settlements, interim decisions are often unreviewable as there is no final decision, and
these interim decisions are conducted out of reach of appellate review. 101 Even if these
decisions were reviewable, another difficulty is that managerial judging lacks
transparency: active case management occurs out of public view, off record, and judges
are not obligated to offer written decisions. 102 Finally, because of its unreviewable nature
and lack of transparency, managerial judging is more likely to be affected by partiality and
bias. In its less pernicious form, prior decisions by judges in the pretrial process may shape
their later judgments. 103 In its more pernicious form, managerial judging is a fertile field
for the growth of personal bias. 104
Even at its most innocuous, when federal judges engage in active case management,
they encounter tension over the different procedural values that our civil justice system
seeks to advance. While reducing delay and unnecessary expense are doubtless important
when bureaucratically processing pretrial disputes, the caveat is that the criterion of
efficiency is subordinate to the demand of an effective civil justice system that delivers
justice. The experiment described in Part III, and research on procedural justice more
generally, reveals that by affording the parties procedural justice, managerial judges
advance the plural ends of the civil justice system.
Procedurally just managerial judging has benefits that extend beyond the courtroom
as well. Professor Tom Tyler has argued that securing the public's self regulation and
compliance through legitimate and fair procedures is more effective and requires less
98. See Stehen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV.
631, 639 (1994).
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resources than the traditional model of surveillance and punishment.10 5 Tyler's research
has revealed that an individual's belief in the legitimacy of rules ("legitimacy") is more
important to her decision on whether to follow those rules than the perceived risk of
punishment, and similarly that an individual's internalization of those rules as personal
moral values ("morality") is far more likely to prompt rule abiding behavior than the risk
of punishment. 106 The elements of procedural justice, (voice, neutrality, respect, and trust)
are the source of legitimacy and morality. 107 Tyler has demonstrated that the key factor
shaping both long and short term compliance with legal rules is the fairness of the
processes used by authorities when dealing with the public. 108
Beyond compliance, just procedures also advance the plural process values of the
civil justice system. The way in which people are treated by authorities, such as judges
and court personnel, communicates relational information, such as their degree of
inclusion within society and their social status. 109 Specifically, procedurally just treatment
communicates an individual's right to come to court and that they will have their needs
and concerns taken seriously by the authorities. 1 10 Fair procedures communicate that
litigants are respected and treated with dignity. 1 I1 This relational information is valuable,
independent of outcomes. 112 While outcomes might be indeterminate or variable, how
parties should be treated is much more concrete. 113 Even in the face of adverse outcomes,
procedurally fair treatment has a significant effect on subsequent behavior. 114 While
courts are unable to control whether any given litigant will ultimately receive a favorable
decision, courts can nonetheless afford litigants with meaningful process that makes
dispute resolution less painful-meaningful process that is experienced as just.
In sum, when managerial judges administer the pretrial process of disputes, they
should consider the public's experiences of justice. For their part, federal judges must do
their utmost to infuse their pretrial interactions with disputants and their lawyers with
procedural justice. We must strive for fair, appropriate pretrial interactions with the public
and legal procedures that are procedurallyjust and that diminish experiences of procedural
injustice. Moreover, managerial judges should consider the effects of their pretrial
decisions on the experiences of justice that the disputants are likely to obtain, especially if
these decisions tradeoff time, cost, and experiences of justice. Judges must be vigilant
about the quality of their managerial judging, not simply the quantity or speed of cases
processed.' i This human-centered approach to managerial judging is deeply consistent
105. See Tyler, supra note 12.
106. Id. at 31.
107. Id. at 33-45.
108. Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 292
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111. Id. at 536
112. Id. at 527-28.
113. Id.
114. Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Eject of Procedural Justice on Spouse
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with the ethos of most judges who wish to treat the public with dignity and respect and to
deliver meaningful access to justice.
CONCLUSION
Our legal culture should expansively embrace a plural view of the values and goals
of the civil justice system, emphasizing psychological science on procedural justice as an
important means of advancing these plural values. Our legal culture should balance plural
values, including a concern for efficiency, while carefully addressing the public's
experience of justice in particular civil justice contexts. Ultimately, the public's
experiences of procedural justice and injustice should be measured, evaluated, and taken
into account when selecting among different processes and dueling constructions of
procedural rules that seek to advance the ends of the civil justice system.
In closing, we have drawn on the field of psychological science and experimental
methods to examine the plural effects of procedural justice. This study experimentally
examined the effect of procedural justice on experiences and perceptions of overall
fairness, outcome satisfaction, positive emotions, negative emotions, legal accuracy,
effectiveness ofprocess, and legitimacy. Consistent with prior literature and our theory-
and across all dependent measures-when procedural justice was withheld, irrespective of
the favorability of the outcome obtained, this procedural injustice diminished perceptions
and experiences of overall fairness, outcome satisfaction, positive and negative emotions,
legal accuracy, effectiveness of process, and legitimacy. Conversely, when members of
the public were afforded procedural justice, their perceptions and experiences of these
dimensions rose. Although outcomes mattered, procedural justice influenced experiences
separate and apart from the outcomes of these disputes. Further, these plural effects
converged on an underlying factor-a fundamental experience of justice.11 6 Finally, the
extent to which an outcome is experienced as just (i.e., a "just result" or outcome
satisfaction) is powerfully influenced by the procedural justice afforded when resolving a
dispute. As such, procedural justice is an important means of manifesting the plural values
that the civil justice system seeks to promote. Moreover, the study reveals the importance
of closely and continuously examining the extent to which members of the public
experience justice within the civil justice system. Civil justice processes that afford
procedural justice shape evaluations of fairness, accuracy, effectiveness, and-
downstream further still-ultimately shape beliefs about whether our civil justice system
is legitimate and just. How the public experiences the civil justice system powerfully
shapes the basic justice that the public expects and desires.
As John Stuart Mill observed in the final words of his magnum opus,
Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly
more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a class;
... and which, therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment not
only different in degree, but also in kind; distinguished from the milder feeling which
attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or convenience, at once by the
116. See supra Part II.C.2.
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more definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner character of its sanctions. 117
In the final calculus, our legal culture must embrace a plural perspective of the values
and aims advanced by the civil justice system, one that accords weight to the American
public's experiences of justice.
117. MILL, supra note 46, at 476.
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